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One of the most peculiar phenomena of the social and 
economic history of Latin America is the unequal, complex and 
slow development of the labor marketl. The pattern of primitive 
accumulation which occurred in diverse regions of Europe and 
which sparked off the proletarianization of the peasants was not 
the case in every region of the continent mentioned. In numerous 
zones, the expansion of capitalism, especially since the 19th 
century, did not imply the immediate expropriation of peasant 
production means- land and animals. On the contrary, capitalist 
penetration implied the reproduction of pre-existing indigenous 
institutions. These peasant institutions served as a reserve of 
labor. However, the recruitment of workers was extremely difficult. 
From the end of the 19th century, and throughout the first half of 
the present century, labor scarcity has been the main problem 
underlying the process of capitalist expansion. The dynamics of 
labor market formation contradicts Lewis' (1954) theoretical 
approach. He argued that the traditional rural sector had an 
unlimited supply of workers, available for the modern sector. 
Historical evidence has demonstrated that in Perú (Scott 1976), 
México (Knight 1986), Colombia (LeGrand 1984), Puerto Rico 
1.  The original spanish version of this article was translated by Deborah Falaron 
in 1992, at SUNY-Binghamton New York. All subsequent changes are my 
responsability. 
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(Bergac 1983), and Guatemala (McCreery 1983) the rising 
capitalist enterprises had to resort to diverse means in order to 
recruit workers. 
Expressed differently, many regions confronted a series of 
difficulties in the process of proletarianization. As Brass (1979) 
notes, ir1 numerous regions of Latin America, most of the rural 
population could not have been easily brought to work on the 
haciendas or plantations. In Perú, the option of immediately 
expropriating the means of production was not possible in al1 
cases. Vilhen the haciendas expanded and occupied indigenous 
lands, the process was slow, and produced a series of conflicts 
(Jacobsen 1993). The alternative of bringing in labor from other 
countries for the sugar plantations ended up by being more 
complicated than useful. Either the import of African slaves came 
to be ex1:remely complex matter, or the rate of their reproduction 
was too low in order to solve the problems of labor shortage 
(Mallon 1983:55; Morner 1977:402). In the regions of lesser 
population density, such as the tropical forest and northern coast 
of Perú (Klaren 1977:229-52), the western region of Cundimarca 
and Tolirna in Colombia (Legrand 1984:33), the coffee regions of 
Puerto Rico (Bergad 1983,1984), the coastal zones of Guatema- 
la (McCreery 1983) etc., the non-existence of indigenous com- 
munities complicated labor recruitment to an even greater degree. 
The only possibility left was to increase commodity circulation 
within the highland communities -or in other regions- to the 
point where peasants not only developed a need for certain com- 
modities they could not produce, but also owed money to mer- 
chants and had to seek temporary employment elsewhere to pay 
off their debts (Mallon 1983:55). In this way, peasant workers 
could be recruited and transported to these areas. 
Within this historical context of labor shortage, peasants were 
recruited: by means of advancing money or merchandise, which 
was delivered by acontractor, under the condition that the peasant 
would work on the tropical plantations. This system was also 
intensely used in order to recruit workers to the mines of the 
Central Andes of Perú. In Perú, Colombia and Bolivia, this system 
was known as enganche -to hook- of manpower (Klaren 
1977;Larson 1988:318; LeGrand 198453). In other regions it was 
called -habilitación,,, <.endeude» or <<contrata». In al1 cases, 
however, the same pattern of social and economic relations was 
reproduced. Through a system of labor contracting, large 
contingents of labor were transferred, from the densely populated 
zones to the frontier regions, where agricultural products were 
cultivated for export. 
In Perú, the «enganche» of peasant labor, from the end of the 
last century, was the most irnportant mechanismforthe recruitment 
of workers. The analysis of the institution of engancheis the object 
of this article. The first objective of this article is to analyze the 
historical conditions which induced the expansion of enganche 
or debt bondage in Perú, during this century. In ourwork, first, we 
will demonstrate that the need for large contingents of labor, as 
a consequence of the expansion of capitalism in diverse sectors 
of national agriculture and mining, led to the engancheof peasant 
workers residing in the highland communities. In some regions, 
of very low population density where the plantations were 
established, absolute scarcity of labor obliged the plantation 
administrators to use enganche in order to cover their labor needs. 
In others, the access of peasants to their means of production or 
the competition of agricultural companies in other economic 
activities which granted higher remunerations- relative scarcity 
of labor - was the cause behind the expansion of enganche. In 
both cases, the non-existence of a regional labor market which 
was sufficiently developed, led to the use of such a system. This 
was a result of the low commodification of land. In other words, 
the land market still had not proletarianized a wide sector of the 
peasant population. It was crucial for the administrators of the 
sugar plantations to recruit labor at a low cost, which would allow 
them to obtain a certain rate of profits. For the administrators of 
the sugar plantations, Enganche was the mechanism which could 
most adequately supply cheap labor power 
12 Eduardo Bedoya Garlant 
Our paper will also demonstrate how enganche was initially 
supported by three power structures. In the beginning, it was the 
state itself which legalized the use of enganche and backed the 
local and regional elite for the recruitment of peasants. Later, the 
regional and local power structures were the ones which 
legitimized the use of enganche. These two power systems, on 
the regional level -mayors, police, prefects, landlords reaiding 
in nearby cities and villages-and on the local level -indigenous 
commuriities- made up a complex network of power called 
«gamonalismo~~ - local bossism2. This power network is one of the 
aspects which permitted the recruitment of bonded workers and 
payment of debt by coercive means. The use of extra-economical 
means in enganche was facilitated by the regional gamonal 
structure. First: we will review the historical evidence referred ts 
two Periivian regions -the northern coast and the central high- 
lands. Ir1 this section we will attempt to articulate rural capitalist 
development with enganche and the use of extraeconomic 
coercion. Our analysis will cover the end of the 1800s and the first 
half of the 20th century. Second, on the basis of historical evidence 
it will be possible to review the theoretical debate. Therefore, we 
will describe the arguments developed by both extremes of the 
debate related to the useof coercion in enganche-theneoclassic 
and marxist approaches. 
l .  Patteirns of labor recruitment on Peruvian plantations of the 
northern coast 
According to Blanchard (1 979:65), the system of enganche was 
designed to resolve the acute problem of labor shortage on sugar 
2 .  The word gamonal originates from the term gamonito, a short thick parasite 
sucker that grows near the roots of vines, absorbin sap meant to feed the frui:. 
The gamonal exercises economic and political power at the community level, 
exploits tbe peasant population, terrorizes them and also covmits cruel acts 
against them (Taylor n.d. 11 7). 
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plantations of the northern coast of Perú (1979:65). Everything 
seems to show, indeed, that large-scale peasant migration from 
the upper zones to the coastal region occurred through engan- 
che from the 1890s on, as a result of the labor demand generated 
by growth of the sugar exporting industry (Burga y Flores 1979: 
61 ; Gonzales 1985: 123). Manuel Burga (1 976), in a study of the 
origins of the hacienda system in the Jequetepeque valley on the 
coast of Perú, argues that enganche developed as a consequen- 
ce of the expansion of capitalist agriculture towards the end of the 
19th century3. 
The social history of Peruvian plantations indicates that a 
variety of recruiting means were utilized in different regions, and 
at different times. In al1 cases, the aim was to solve the chronic 
problem of labor scarcity. Specifically, some plantations along 
the coast resorted to African slaves or Japanese indentured la- 
bor, as well as the enganche of peasants out of the highland 
communities of northern Perú4. Changes in the way labor re- 
cruitment was carried out were due to factors of a demographic 
3 .  The systern of enganche has its roots in the Peruvian highlands, where it 
existed as a mechanisrn for recruiting local workers, and only later spread to 
the coast. Moreover, these roots have a clear colonial cornponent. Bonilla 
(1 974: 41) argues that enganche was typically colonial means for recruiting a 
labor force. Sirnilarly, Macera (1977: 269-271), maintains that in colonial Perú, 
this way of supplying labor functioned sirnilarly to the systerns of .corregido- 
res., .caciques.., ffguatacos= and -buscadores-. Macera presents evidence 
based on the study of the archives in colonial haciendas of Cajamarca and the 
southern highlands during the 18th century. 
4. The historian Arnold Meagher (1975), in a study carried out on the introduction 
of Chinese workers in Latin Arnerica. has defined indentured servitude as 
follows: -1ndenture was originally adeed contract between two or more parties 
written on one piece of parchment or paper and cut in two in a serrated or 
zigzag line so that when brought together the two edges tallied showing that 
they were parts of the sarne original docurnent. Later indenture carne todenote 
for binding an apprentice or servant to his master, or a contract by which a 
person bound himself to service-. 
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and economical nature. Slave workers were imported from the 
Caribbean, northern South America and Africa (Bowser 1974; 
Gonzales 1985:14). For three centuries, slave labor of African 
origin played a vital role in the development of the sugar industry. 
However, in 1810, the slave trade was completely shut off by 
Great Britain, and despite improvements made in work conditions 
on the sugar plantations, the slave population was unable to grow 
at the rate deemed necessary for covering the sugar plantation 
needs (Gonzales 1985: 19-20). Later on, between 1849 and 1874 
approximately 100.000 <(indentured,, servants from China emi- 
grated to Perú. This covered the void created by the reduction in 
the black slave population and the abolition of slavery, decreed 
in 1854. Between 1898 and 1923, some of the owners of the 
largest plantations imported c<contracted,, Japanese workers 
(Gonzales 1985:118-120). However, the migration of Japanese 
workers did not cover the needsfor labor on the sugar plantations. 
Coiisequently, in a parallel and gradual way, the plantation 
admini:;trators resorted to contracting some highland peasants 
who could travel seasonally to the coast, in search of monetary 
revenue. In reality, this indigenous labor had been used spo- 
radically on the Peruvian coast since the 17th century, but, had 
never been sufficient for the needs of the sugar industry (Klaren 
1976:242). According to the national 1876 census, Perú had a 
populaition of approximately 2,699,106 inhabitants, and two-thirds 
of theni lived in the Andean highlands (Blanchard 1979:65; 
Garland 1908:204; Thorp and Bertham 1978:44). In the rural 
coastal regions, where the sugar plantations were located, there 
was still a serious problem of labor scarcity, despite the process 
of conc;entrating the best lands in hands of a small number of 
owners and its consequent process of proletarianization (Klaren 
1976:240). During this period, local workers and highland 
peasarits who seasonally migrated, did not cover the demands 
of the sugar plantations (Gonzales 1985: 121 ; Klaren 1976:241). 
It is in this context of local labor shortage and difficulties in 
recruitrnent of foreign labor that enganche became massively 
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used, especially in the upper regions of Cajamarca (Gonzales 
1985: 123; Deere 1990:45). 
The hacienda was the most important economic and political 
institution in the region of Cajamarca. The basis of its strength 
was found in its overwhelming control over land (Taylor 1979:14; 
Mallon 1987:252). Although only a third of the peasant population 
lived within the haciendas, the haciendas controlled two-thirds of 
the land. Therefore, most of the rural population depended on 
hacienda resources, even though they did not reside within its 
territory. For this reason, enganche in the highlands of Cajamarca 
was tightly linked to the power of the landlords. The bondsmen in 
the Cajamarca highlands were very often owners of local hacien- 
das, who were complying with their role as labor recruiters for the 
coastal plantations. In 1897, for example, the plantation owners 
of Cayaltí declared that labourers of the Chota region could only 
be contracted by hacienda owners in that region, since they were 
the only ones who supposedly understood the complexities of 
enganche (Gonzales 1985:128). Another well-known case was 
that of Eleodoro Benel, owner of the El Triunfo hacienda in the 
district of Santa Cruz (Taylor n.d.:26). During 1919, Benel obtai- 
ned high profits by recruiting workers from his hacienda and 
from the nearby minifundist zones of the region, for the sugar 
plantations of Cayaltí and Tumán (Taylor n.d.:27-28). But Benel 
was not only a bondsman and hacienda owner, he was also a 
legendary figure capable of organizing and mobilizing the peasant 
population in armed bands against his political enemies (Taylor 
n.d.: ch.4,5). This powerfacilitated Benel's ability to recruit workers 
within his own territory, and allowed him to fight violently against 
other bondsmen such as Coronado and Regalado (Taylor n.d.; 
90,94). 
Plantation owners granted the bondsmen monopolistic rights 
over the recruitment of peasants in the highland districts of 
Cajamarca (Gonzales 1985: 129; Deere 1990:47). This allowed 
the bondsman to exert certain control over the movements of 
peasant workers in each region. Nevertheless, competition for 
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labourers always existed, as demonstrated by the fact that more 
than orie plantation in each district had bondsmen (Gonzales 
1985: 1 :30-131). For example, in Bambamarca, the main district 
from which labor was recruited for Cayaltí, there were a total of 
twelve bondsmen recruiting labor for diverse plantations 
(Gonzales 1985: 129). 
According toTaylor (1 979) and Gonzales (1 985), recruitment 
of workers from the upper regions of Cajamarca did not always 
demand the use of extra-economic coercion. Taylor (1979:156) 
affirms that the shortage of lands, combined with the moneta- 
rization of srnall-scale agriculture, converted wage work into an 
essential activity. Gonzales (1 985: 126) supports Taylor's 
argument, and also asserts that the hacienda owners in Cajamarca 
were the ones who created conditions favorable to migration. 
Throughout this century, the capitalist development of dairy and 
cattle cictivities in Cajamarca forced haciendas to expel many 
tenants. This caused migration of somefree peasants to the coast. 
In other cases, the less desirable hacienda lands were sold to the 
same peasants. In this way the landlords were freed of tenants, 
with whom they had maintained rent-based production relations. 
In the face of monetary need, the peasants turned to bonding in 
order to pay off their debts (Gonzales 1985; Taylor n.d.). Finally, 
we havir the case of the Larco family, owners of a plantation in the 
Chicarria valley, who bought lands from the Llaucán hacienda in 
1920, and thus forced labor to migrate to the coastal valley of 
Chicania (Miller 1967:328; Deere 1990:48-49). Taking advantage 
of the power they had as landlords, the Larco family used numerous 
means to recruit workers, such as cash advance payments or the 
carrying out of traditional tributary obligations through work on 
the plantations. 
Gonzales asserts that enganche implied a combination of 
econoiliic incentives, such as wage raises to the bonded workers, 
and other methods such as physical deterltion in order to preven! 
worker mobiiity (Gonzales 1985:126; see alsc Klaren i 976:241). 
Deb~s  consti:uted a fundamental part of this recruiting system, 
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but there is no evidence that they were used as a way to 
proletarianize the labor force (Gonzales 1985: 11 7-1 18). In a simi- 
lar fashion, the Peruvian state permitted the existence of engan- 
che and collaborated with plantation owners for control of labor, 
but it did not systematically help in the contracting of labourers. 
Generally, Gonzales insists that the role of the market should be 
included in any analysis of enganche. For example, competition 
for labor recruitment among plantation owners influenced the 
wage scales of the bonded workers and commissions paid to the 
bondsmen. Also, changes in international sugar prices were 
another determining factor in daily wages and the amount of the 
commission (Gonzales 1985: 134). However, Gonzales does not 
problematize the effect of debt on production relations. For this 
author, the massive migrations to the coast were only a ((controlled 
movement of humanity, directed by labor contractors, and sugar 
planters ,,. With this type of definition of enganche, it is difficult to 
analyze the presence of extra-economic factors in the recruitment 
of labor, and to understand the non-free nature of the production 
relations to which the bonded workers were subject. The analysis 
of enganche is limited to the recruitment phase and not to the 
effect it has in production relations. 
Scott (1 976; 1978) developed a different analysis of bonded 
labor in the northern coast of Perú. He argued that the use of 
enganche corresponded to a historical stage in the development 
of a labor market (Scott 1976:321; 1978). From the end of the past 
century until the 1940s, labor scarcity obligated plantations to 
use enganche in order to obtain labor from the peasant com- 
munities of Cajamarca (Scott 1976:323-324). During the second 
period, occurring between 1940 and 1960, enganche continued 
to exist, but it did so in a way that was free of extra-economic 
coercion. According to Scott, labor was [[free,, in the capitalist 
sense of the word. Enganche had been transformed into a simple 
capitalist, contractual relation. The relationship between the 
bondsman, the bonded worker and the plantation owners 
completely lacked any kind of coercive factors. A process of 
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capitalist development had been initiated in the Cajamarca 
highlands, which separated the peasants from their means of 
production, and proletarianized their labor power. Along parallel 
lines, there was an increase in population density, which led to an 
increase in migration from the highlands to the coast (Scott 
1976:3:35-340). Some of the plantations initiated technical changes 
which entailed the contracting of permanent workers. In al1 areas, 
except Lambayeque, enganche had disappeared. 
Overall, plantations on the Peruvian coast initiallyexperienced 
a period of labor shortage, but the situation evolved throughout 
the cen:ury into one of absolute labor abundance (Scott 1976:323; 
1978). Enganche completely disappeared in the 1960s. Scott 
mentioris that the theory of articulation of the modes of production 
is precisely what predicts this type of development. This contrasts 
drastically with the dual model of Lewis (1954), who affirmed that 
development of a labor market occurred in exactly the opposite 
way, ¡.e. from relative abundance to relative scarcity of labor. 
Generally speaking, the argument developed by Scott is extremely 
suggestive, especially as far as criticism to Lewis' model is 
concerned. The way he places enganche within a stage of labor 
market formation is quite useful. Nevertheless, Scott should have 
been more explicit when he points out that, from the 1940s on, 
enganche had ceased to be a coercive means for recruiting la- 
bor. It is theoretically possible, with the changes provoked by 
capitalist development in agriculture, that enganche underwent 
a deep transformation. However, the author does not describe in 
detail how the use of extra-economic elements disappeared in 
that period. 
11. Enganche in the central highlands 
During three centuries of colonial regime and fifty years of 
republican dominion, the central Andean region was characterized 
by a dynamic peasant economy, organized by indigenous 
communities. The regional peasant communities managed to 
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maintain a relatively efficient household economy. As Mallon 
(1987:238) points out, the indigenous communities in the region 
had historically participated in the commercial economy, using 
the resources gained through such trade to reproduceand defend 
their economic institutions. This strategy was so successful that 
in 1870, only a few haciendas were in existence in the region 
(Mallon 1987:238-239). In that year, 75 % of the peasant population 
was residing outside the haciendas and had control of the best 
lands. Thus, the way in which enganche spread was different 
than in the case of Cajamarca. With the purpose of bonding 
peasants, the mines and tropical plantations had to establish 
more direct relations with the indigenous communities. 
In the departments of Junín, Huánuco, Cerro de Pasco and 
Huancavelica, enganche initially intensified as a consequence of 
the development of mining in the highlands, and to a lesser degree, 
because of coffee expansion in the tropical valley of Chan- 
chamayo, from the end of the 1870s. However, commercial capi- 
tal facilitated the use of the enganche system in order to recruit 
a labor force to both regions. The arrival of merchants occurred 
when they discovered that commercial agriculture was highly 
lucrative. Although the expansion of mining had not consolidated 
the formation of an interna1 regional market, demand for specific 
food products did increase (1 98358). The overall impact was the 
commercialization of agricultural activities within the indigenous 
communities (Mallon 1983:67; Dewind 1987:274). Many 
merchants bought lands in the communities, and introduced cash 
crops or started to commercialize peasant production. Others 
took advantage of the need for cash among indigenous farmers 
by bonding them to the mines and tropical plantations. The fact 
is that peasant agriculture redirected itself towards a market 
system (Mallon 1983: 67). This process of commercial capital 
entering the region was not new, but it happened intensively 
during this period. On the other hand, migrations to the mines 
accelerated the penetration process of commercial capital even 
more, along with social differentiation within the indigenous 
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communities. This especially occurred in communities which were 
closest to the most important cities and roads. 
The rich peasants who seasonally migrated to the mines did 
so in order to accumulate more money, while those who were 
poorer lnad an immediate need for cash. The richest were able to 
take a larger share of animals and food products to the mines, so 
they dicl not have to depend so heavily on the advances given by 
bondsn~en. With al1 these resources, rich peasants could pay 
their debts off more rapidly. There was an entirely different reality 
for the poor peasants, since dueto their scant economic resources, 
the anirnals and food which they took to the mines did not suffice, 
and thus they ended up depending heavily on monetary advances 
and clothesfrom the bondsmen (Mallon 1983:74). Consequently, 
the period for debt repayment among poor peasants was 
decidedly more prolonged. This interfered with their ability to 
return to their home communities to carry out agricultural tasks. 
Among other things, the bonded peasants had to contract other 
peasants, and pay them daily wages. This monetary expense 
had to be covered by more debts, which impoverished the bonded 
workers even more (Dewind 1987:303). 
Nevertheless, a large contingent of bonded workers was never 
able to finish paying off their debts, and escaped one way or 
another. Once this happened, the bondsmen claimed their 
payments from the sureties or guarantors of those debts, since 
their nc.mes appeared on the initial enganche contract (Mallon 
1983:7!5-6). The bondsmen eventually recovered their loaned 
capital by confiscating the cattle or lands of the sureties (Bonilia 
1974:4:2). Later on, the sureties, w5o were usually wealthy pea- 
sants, ciemanded payment from the poor peasants through land 
(Dewind 1978:162,278). The most immediate consequence was 
an even higher concentration of lands in the handsof rich peasants. 
Generally speaking, enganche unleashed a series of social and 
econornic processes. As we explained, in another document, 
Simón E3olivar's decree to privatize the lands controlled by peasant 
communities initiated the commodification of land (Bedoya 1993, 
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see also Dewind 1978). However, this process was slow and 
uneven. The entry of commercial capital accelerated these 
dynamics and allowed enganche to spread. Furthermore, in order 
for enganche to function, it was necessary for private property to 
exist in those communities. That is, in orderfor the land belonging 
to the bonded workers or sureties to be included as part of the 
guarantee included in the contracts, it had to be considered 
private property. In short, a land market began to spring up from 
the time when mercantile capital entered the scene; however, it 
was the enganche system which accelerated this process (Dewind 
1 978). 
Later on, between 1896 and 1900, the Peruvian government 
initiated construction of the so-called <<vía central,,. This road 
would connect the tropical regions of the river valleys of Ucayali 
and Chanchamayo to the provinces of the central Andes, and 
ultimately to the port of Callao in Lima (Capelo 1895). But, 
construction of this highway faced the difficulty of regional labor 
shortages. In 1897, it was calculated that a total of 300 workers 
was required for construction of the highway, and bondsmen 
were only able to obtain a third of them (Blanchard 1979:76). As 
Mallon (1983:142) states, during these years the region of the 
central Andes went through a period of economic prosperity. At 
the same time, coffee expansion in the region of Chanchamayo 
had taken a new turn. An increase in international coffee prices 
converted the Chanchamayo district into an exporter of coffee to 
Europe and Chile (Barclay 1989:80). Hundreds of hectares of 
coffee generated a higher demand for labor in the provinces of 
Tarma, Jauja and Huancayo in the district of Junín. Enganche 
was used to cover this demand. As a result, both mining and 
agricultura1 activities and later construction of the ((vía central= 
were al1 competing for indigenous labor. The fact is that the 
indigenous population could not cover the labor needs of these 
diverse economic activities. 
Moreover, despite the fact that commercial penetration into 
the communities accelerated peasant differentiation, most of the 
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indigenous population maintained significant control over their 
means of production, ¡.e. their lands and cattle (Mallon 1982:142). 
As proletarianization of peasants became a more complicated 
affair, !:he government of Piérola had to legitimize the use of en- 
ganche and the coercive mechanisms this implied. In 1897, the 
goverriment published a series of regulations which obliged the 
bonded workers on tropical plantations to pay back their debts 
before abandoning their work (Blanchard 1979:79; Barclay 
1989:79). In other words, the state legalized the loss of freedom 
of the bonded workers, who then legally had no right to sell their 
labor power while they were working on the plantations to pay off 
their debts. Likewise, this ruling prohibited children less than 
twelve years old from working, as v~ell as prohibiting women from 
working at night. The ruling also attempted to reduce the abuses 
committed by local authorities in the process of recruitment. For 
this reason, public enganche offices were established in Tarma, 
Huancavelica and Ayacucho. However, the tropical plantations 
felt they could not bond workers without the support of local 
authorities and resorted to agents who were called <<sub-en- 
ganchadores,. (Barclay 1989: 1 16). Indeed, these agents were 
persons contracted by the bondsmen, which due to the new 
rules, Fiad to begin working with the public offices. Hence, the 
establishment of public enganche offices was only a formality. 
Enganche continued to function with the firm support of the local 
power structure. Public offices were subordinated to the local 
power inechanisms. 
Five years later, in 1902, the government elaborated a new 
code which also regulated enganche for the tropical plantations. 
This code required the registration of contracts, as well as their 
enforcement by local authorities. In 1903, the government pu- 
blished a general work code for the mining industry, which 
authori;zed public officials to pursue bonded workers who had 
escaped without paying off the total amount of their debts (Mallon 
1983:143). All these acts of legislation were part of an attempt to 
legitimize enganche, both in the recruitment phase and at the 
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level of production relations. From the congressional repre- 
sentative and district prefects to authorities within the indigenous 
communities, a political structure was formed to consolidate 
enganche, and effectively carry it out through available legal 
support (Blanchard 1979:80; Mallon 1983: 143). The complex 
network was reinforced, by having both national and local 
authorities back enganche tactics, in their common interest to 
control the indigenous labor force. 
111. The debate on enganche and additional comments 
Most of the researchers we have cited for our discussion agree 
more or less on what actually occurred in the central Andes at the 
end of the past century and beginning of the present one. For 
example, Dewind (1 987), Bonilla (1 974) and Mallon (1 983), agree 
that the expansion of mining produced an accelerated growth of 
commercial capital in the region, as well as an increase in socio- 
economic differences within the indigenous communities. Howe- 
ver, there are certain discrepancies in the analysis on the impact 
of enganche. One of these divergences was on the level of 
reproduction or destruction of traditional social and economic 
relations of indigenous communities, as a result of enganche. On 
one hand, Dewind insists throughout his work that enganche 
caused a sharp process of monetarization through diverse 
mechanisms within the indigenous communities. The author 
affirms that the subsistence economy, based on non-monetary 
labor relations, was slowly replaced bywage work, private property 
of land and commercial agricultural production (Dewind 
1987:390). On the other hand, Bonilla (1974) affirms that engan- 
che to the mines did not totally disconnect the peasant from his 
lands in the communities. Bonilla points out that during the first 
three decades, capitalist mining relations did not dissolve the 
noncapitalist relations of production of the peasant communities; 
instead, they were reinforced. 
Mallon (1983) also argues that enganche did not radically 
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modify production relations in the indigenous communities. Mallon 
suggests that even if the peasant economy seemed to be quite 
flexible while facing the impact of regional commercialization, it 
also relsisted when faced with total proletarianization (Mallon 
1983:209). It was precisely thefact that the peasantfamily carried 
outvarious jobs during the times of agricultural rest that eventually 
allowetJ the economic resources to be transferred once again 
toward agriculture. For example, the monetary revenues obtained 
througli trade, handcrafting or wage work were used to buy land 
or cattle. When the peasants migrated with food and animals to 
the mines, they used these resources to reduce monetary ex- 
penses, thereby obtaining acertain level of accumulation (Mallon 
1983:209-210). Therefore, according to Mallon, enganche to the 
mines was unable to proletarianize the labor force, and even 
managed to reinforce production relations within the peasant 
communities and throughout the region in general. Concretely. 
both the strategies of investment and migration made the survival 
of the peasant economy possible. These strategies which cul- 
minated in the reproduction of non-capitalist production relations, 
were not carried out to avoid modernization of regional agriculture, 
rather 'they existed in order to defend their revenues, and their 
peasarit form of production (Mallon 1983:209; see also Burga 
1976:244). However, Mallon (1 983: 149) does not adequately 
analyze what she mentions in her book, which is that the success 
level oí the migration strategies varied according to whether the 
peasants were rich or poor. For example. unlike the poor peasants, 
the rict-I ones carried considerable resources to the mines, which 
permitted them to save and accumulate. On the contrary, the 
poor peasants lacked sufficient resources, and therefore ended 
up more heavily indebted to the bondsmen, and in some cases 
to the rnercantile of the mining company. 
An~t.her important discrepancy refers to the presence of extra- 
econoinic factors in the process of labor recruitment and 
production relations to which the bonded workers were subject 
to in the mines or on the plantations. After an article was published 
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by the historian Arnold Bauer [[Rural Workers in Spanish America: 
Problems of Peonage and Oppression,> (1 979) a debate ensued 
which began to question the interpretations given on the 
characteristics of different forms of coerced labor which had been 
expanded during the two last centuries. On one hand, Bauer 
argued that the gradual transition to freer forms of labor should 
be understood within a context of transition from noncapitalist to 
capitalist forms of agricultural production. This process of 
transformation of agriculture was produced at different rates and 
in an unequal fashion (lbid:35). On the other hand, this author 
intended to eliminate the emotional or subjective content of this 
historical debate and emphasize the rational analysis of past 
institutions. For Bauer what is important is not to indict a group of 
people but rather to explain asystem. Based on this, Bauer pointed 
out that the history of the working class in Spanish America has 
<[involved exploitation and aggression, but it is also a record of 
give and take, choice and accommodation~~ (Ibid). In this sense, 
Bauer criticized a study by Klaren (1 970) on the origins of Aprista 
party and the sugar plantations in Perú. According to Bauer 
(lbid:37), Klaren reflects the traditional view that the sugar 
plantations imposed a harsh system of debt bondage through an 
enganche type of labor recruitment. 
Within this context, Bauer questioned the conventional point 
of view which emphasized the relationship between debt and 
bondage. He pointed out that when plantation owners or 
administrators did not have the backing or support of the local 
political structure to bind workers, the system of indebtedness 
could be considered as a kind of credit; (cthat is advances of cash 
and goods against the promise of future work,, (I bid:36). Moreover, 
Bauer questioned that the system of advances in all historical 
circumstances carried coercive power (lbid:46-47). In order to 
prove the presence of peonage, there must be evidence that the 
owners of plantations or haciendas were restricting the mobility 
of the workers. Bauer pointed out that in the cases of the YucatBn 
and the Southeast Mexican lowlands in North America and Putu- 
26 Eduardo Bedoya Garlant 
mayo in the Amazon Basin, disagreement does not exist -the 
system of debts furnished the legal basis for coercion. Likewise, 
local police and the army restricted the movement of workers and 
prevented them from leaving the plantations (Ibid). 
Nonetheless, Bauer affirms that in the case of the northern 
coast of Perú, the sugar plantation owners did not have the capacity 
to restricd the mobility of workers recruited under the enganche 
system. Bauer suggests that the system of debt bondage or 
advance of wages did not constitute a mechanism which im- 
mobilized workers. According to the author, the advances -which 
were quite heavy in some cases- reflected the fact that the 
bondsmen and planters had to compete for peasant labor. 
Likewise, this means that the peasants had a certain capacity for 
negotiation. This capacity was reinforced by the fact that the 
peasants maintained their access to their own means of production 
-land arid animals. Therefore, if the owner of the plantation had 
to grant advances of wages to the peasants and pay commissions 
to the bondsman, this was simply the expression of a new and 
imperfecl: labor market. Hence, the cost of bonded labor should 
be analyz:ed within the context of supply and demand of the labor 
market. 
Bauer's account makes important contributions to the study 
of enganche. One contribution is that the system of debts did not 
imply coercion in al1 historical circumstances. This was the case, 
for example: when debts could be paid in a short term of time. A 
second valuable feature was the observation that peasants had 
a certain capacity for negotiation, especially in the recruiting 
phase. In this sense, Bauer stresses that the relation between the 
bondsman and the bonded worker is indeed complex. As Giddens 
(1986:93) indicates, power relations are relations of autonomy 
and dependence. Even the most autonomous individual is 
dependect to some degree, and the most dependent actor retains 
some autonomy (Ibid). 
However, Bauer's analysis has serious limitations. The neo- 
classical eipproach tends to downplay the importance of political 
Bonded labor, coercion and capitalism development in Perú 27 
structure and ethnic differentiation as mechanisms that make the 
use of enganche possible. Gamonalismo, as a political system, 
is not discussed by Bauer. The role of the political apparatus in 
the recruitment of workers was not limited to cases in the Yucatán 
region of México or Putumayo in the Amazon basin. In the 
confidential correspondence of the haciendas or plantations, there 
are numerous pieces of proof that the landlords or planters 
constantly resorted to local power in order to recruit workers. The 
purpose of gamonalismo was to impose tributary relations on and 
politically subordinate the peasant population. Labor control was 
certainly one of its most important objectives (Bedoya 1993). The 
control of the labor force through gamonalismo was based on 
ethno-cultural differentiation between the indigenous peasant 
population, and the social classes supporting the landlords. 
Gamonalismo legitimized and reinforced these differences. In- 
deed, the political power of the bondsman cannot be understood 
if we do not understand gamonalismo first. In order to recruit 
workers, enganche required the support of the others who were 
related to gamonalpower. The evidence presented in this paper 
tends to reinforce this trend 
The failure of the neo-classical perspective to comprehend 
the importance of political factors leads to an inadequate analysis 
of the development of the labor market in Latin America. This is 
the result of the way the transition to capitalism in this region has 
been focused on. In first place, the transition to a labor market 
was not immediate or definitive. The development of capitalism 
was not a linear process, but rather an uneven one. While the 
market economy was expanding, a series of economic institutions 
and social relations of production not corresponding to the 
classical model of industrial enterprises and wage work, were 
used (Wallernstein 1974:27; Tomich 1990:2; Mintz 1977:253-256). 
The fact is that in this process, slavery, enganche, indenture, 
servitude, etc., were resorted to. Labor forms not corresponding 
to the classical form of wage work have served to articulate regions 
to the international market, expand world consumption of certain 
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rnerchandise, widen the international division of work, and have 
been used by the newforeign and local bourgeoisforaccumulation 
purposes. 
Second, the neo-classical perspective does not take into 
account the nature of the relations between capitalism and non- 
capitalism in numerous regions of Latin America. The new 
republican states and growing capitalist institutions during the 
19th ancl 20th centuries took advantage of and transformed, for 
their owri ends, the tributary institutions which already existed in 
the indigenous cornrnunities (Larson 1988:305-321). Likewise, 
local and regional power structures had an influence on the new 
ernerging social relations and labor control institutions. The 
recruitment of peasant labor was tightly linked to these political 
structures. Moreover, it would not have been possible to recruit 
peasants strictly through econornic pressure. The access the 
peasant population had to the rneans of production -land and 
animals--obliged the mine and plantation owners to use coercive 
methods for both labor recruitment and retention. 
Tom Brass (1 988, 1990, 1991 ) has elaborated a marxist cri- 
tique which focused on Bauer's theoretical approach (1979) and 
others such as Cross (1 979), Blanchard (1 979), Shlomowitz (1 991) 
etc, based on his field experience in the valley of La Convención, 
in Cuzco-Perú. Brass (1 990:75; 1991 ) contends that these authors 
were influenced by the neoclassical interpretation of chattel slavery 
in the Arlerican South, as developed by Fogel and Engerman 
(1 974). According to this theoretical perspective. to regard New 
World Pla17tation slavery as wholly negative is incorrect, since the 
slaves not only accepted but also secured material benefits from 
its existence (Ibid). Brass (1991) argues that this approach was 
applied to the studyof enganche. Indeed, since the neo-classical 
perspecti\~e tended to negate the most oppressive aspects of the 
systerns of coerced labor, enganche was not related to the power 
structure and regional class structure. 
The rnost important conlribution rnade by Brass is the 
emphasis OP the loss of freedorn that the bonded workers expe- 
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rienced. Unlike the neo-classicists, approach, Brass pointed out 
that the bonded workers actually lost their right to commodify 
their labor power until the incurred debt had been cleared (see 
also Burga 1976:243). The central characteristic of enganche 
was coercion or lackof freedom in the social relations of production 
on the plantation or in the mines, where the bonded workers 
carried out their labor. The bonded workers could not sell their 
labor force on the free market during the time the debt remained 
unpaid (1 988,1990,1991). Brass argues that the enganche system 
depends on compulsion exercised by the bondsmen. The relations 
between the bonded workers and the bondsmen are the relations 
of those between antagonistic classes. While the bondsmen were 
wealthy peasants, merchants or landlords etc., the bonded 
workers were poor peasants or landless peasants. This type of 
class antagonismfacilitated the use of coercion in order to recruit 
cheap labor outside the labor market. 
Brass stresses that in some cases labor recruitment could be 
free of coercion. However, his research carried out in the south 
of Perú led him to affirm that the recruitment stage also used 
coercion. For example, he affirms that the corporate ideology of 
kinship can be invoked to compel subordinate kin categories to 
become bonded labourers, to pay debts incurred by senior kinsfolk 
(1 990:78-79). In otherwords, the bondsman could use the existing 
traditional relations of reciprocity among relatives to recover non- 
paid debts. Also, unlike Bauer, he pointed out that the system of 
debt implied coercion. According to Bauer, the unequal rela- 
tionship between the bondsman and the indebted worker was 
hidden behind the traditional relations of <<Andean reciprocity=. 
Under these relations, the indebted peasant perceives his 
relationship with the bondsman who advanced him money as one 
of c<equal exchange,, (Ibid). Once again, nevertheless, recipro- 
city relations were subordinated and used by the bondsman for 
his own objectives. 
However, Brass' argument on the non-free nature of the 
bonded workers has some difficulties. In numerous articles, Brass 
insists that enganche provoked the de-commodification of the 
labor force because the bonded workers did not have freedom, 
or at least lost their right to commodify their labor power on the 
open niarket (1 988, 1990, 1991 ). Nevertheless, Brass' error lies 
in misunderstanding the process of labor commodification. The 
fact is Ihat if the bonded worker loses the freedom to sell labor 
power, he or she is transformed into a commodity. In México, for 
example, the debts of the bonded workers were transferred to 
other plantations or haciendas, without their express authorization 
(Knight 1986:88). Expressed differently, from being an owner of 
a comrnodity the bonded worker became a commodity, as 
happeried with slavery. Logically, the loss of freedom of the bon- 
ded workers' did not reach the level of the slaves. Nonetheless, 
both in the case of enganche and in debt peonage, the debts 
could have reached such heavy Ievels that the payment would be 
transferred to following generations, or al1 family members of the , 
bondecl worker would be oblige to work. As Marx mentioned 
(1977:271-272), this was the case of the haciendas in México 
where slavery was concealed under the form of debt peonage. In 
other words, bonded workers were de facto commodities. 
Ancither problematic aspect of Brass's account is that his 
analysis does not allow for variations in the degree of freedom lost 
by the bonded workers. On one hand, he does not recognize that 
the degree of coercion can vary according to historical and re- 
gional circumstances. It is not the same thing when a worker is 
bonded for an amount that can be paid in two weeks, and when 
so much money is advanced that the entire family is obliged to 
work for several months or years in order to pay off the debt. On 
the other hand, neither can we assume that the term <<enganche,> 
has had the same meaning in al1 historical contexts. Cotlear (1 979), 
after carrying out extensive field work, did not find that the 
<<bonded,, peasants in the region of Kosñipata in Cuzco were 
subject to any form of coercion. Cotlear's study seems to de- 
monstrate that the term <<enganche,, in this zone is used to mean 
the recruitment of labor similar to a contract system used in the 
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Peruvian tropical forests, which is indeed free of any type of ex- 
tra-economic coercion. The term ((enganche. must have un- 
dergone a series of transformations through the development of 
new capitalist social relations. 
Ralph Shlomowitz (1 991 : 21 7-224) developed acritique which 
revised Brass. This critique generally followed the arguments 
developed by Bauer (1979), who had questioned the coercive 
nature of enganche as a means of recruiting labor. According to 
Shlomowitz (1991 :216), migrant workers were usually able to 
abandon their workfreely, once the contracts had been complied 
with. The system of advances was not to bond workers, but rather 
to attract them to a free labor market. This pattern of recruiting 
was the result of market forces which protected the worker from 
unfair work contracts. Enganche functioned in benefit of the 
workers and employers, who were guaranteed access to a labor 
market. Shlomowitz (1 991 :218) emphasizes that while the migrants 
could choose among different employers, the system itself 
functioned on the basis of free will for those who wished to accept 
the advances. So, the fact that the employers did not have a 
monopoly over fixing the amount of advances made is evidence 
that they were actually determined by the law of supply and 
demand. In addition, Shlomowitz (1991 :219) pointsout that Brass 
presents no evidence of intentions by employers to permanently 
bond workers, and no proof on several other facets: in first place, 
on the workers who remained bonded for many years; in second 
place, on the amount of debts transferred among employers; and 
in third place, on the lowerwages of the bonded workers. Moreover, 
Shlomowitz (1 991 :220) argues that the wages of migrant workers 
in other regions, such as in Puerto Rico at the end of the last 
century, depended primarily on international coffee prices. 
In general terms, the content of Brass' texts reflects a so- 
phisticated theoretical analysis. However, in some aspects, as 
for example in the wage differences between free and bonded 
workers, or the characteristics of kinship ideology as a means to 
control the labor force, there is little empirical data presented. 
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The aniounts of the advances and their effects on the form of 
surplus extraction also should have been presented. Brass' 
analysis concentrates excessively on the distinction between free 
and non-free work. As we previously mentioned in the case of 
Puerto Rico, Brass tends to ignore the general effects of engan- 
che on a long-term basis. Bergad (1983-1984), Knight (1988), 
McCreery (1 983), Bonilla (1 974): Gonzales (1 985), Klaren (1 976), 
Scott (1976): and Dewind (1987) al1 locate enganche within a 
more general process of proletarianization of the labor force in 
their respective studies. The absence of a historical study which 
analyzes the long term consequences of enganche is one of the 
most important weakness of Brass work. The fact remains that 
enganche both initiated an irreversible process of land 
abandoriment by members of indigenous communities and a 
deterioration of natural resources, which ended up accelerating 
the process of proletarianization of the indigenous labor force. A 
discussion of this process is lacking in Brass' studies, thus 
reducing his analysis to only one aspect of the enganche problem, 
¡.e. the la.ck of freedom for the bonded worker. He also does not 
relate ths! pattern of capitalist accumulation which occurred in the 
peripheral areas with the expansion of coerced systems of labor. 
Likewise, his own field experience is not adequately presented 
throughout his texts. Despite the fact that the empirical evidence 
presented by Brass remains somewhat incomplete, his theoretical 
contribution is extremely important. 
The theoretical perspective of Shlomowitz is centered on 
denying the non-free nature of enganche. Following the neo- ~ 
classic model of economic equilibrium, the inclusion of a non- 
economic element represents a situation of imperfection or 
imbalance within the market. This inclusion undermines the notion 
that the exchange between capital and work is a balanced, 
harmonious relationship of equity; it also does so for the suppo- 
sition that capitalists, in al1 historical circumstances, are interested 
in promoting a free labor market (Brass 1991:235). As Miies 
(1 987:213-.221), Chevalier (1 982:200), Mintz (1 977), and Wallerns- 
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tein (1 974) have demonstrated, the conservation and reproduction 
of unfree relations of production are not restricted to the period 
of colonial expansion and to the transition from feudalism to ca- 
pitalism, they are also a major component of contemporary 
capitalist development. Capital requires the existence of available 
labor to be recruited, as well as a labor force that will result in 
cheap and available workers during specific periods. For this, it 
resorts to various mechanisms -political, in the sense that it 
makes formal or informal use of authority in order to recruit wor- 
kers-; legal, by legalizing coercion-; and ideological-through 
the use of compromises and obligations deriving from kinship 
relations-which are used to reorganize the regional and tempo- 
ral allocation of labor resources, reduce the cost of labor, and 
maintain a level of profits. 
Shlomowitz ignored the fact that enganche responded to a 
historical period of the development of capitalism in the peripheral 
countries. Analysing the historical context in which enganche 
developed implies taking into account the process of regional 
class formation, as well as the pattern of capital accumulation in 
the dominant rural classes. This accumulation was based on an 
economy which was export oriented, and which did not develop 
interna1 accumulation circuits, thereby requiring cheap labor 
power. 
Scott (1976) develops an intermediate position within the 
debate, in his analysis of the sugar plantations. This author argues 
that during thefirst four decades of this century, enganche implied 
the use of coercive methods in order to guarantee labor re- 
cruitment. As we have indicated, about halfway through the 
century, labor began to migrate freely to the coast, dueto several 
socio-economic and demographic variables. Therefore, engan- 
che continued to function, but without extra-economic factors 
present. Nonetheless, the author does not analyze debts as a 
means for controlling and retaining labor. His analysis 
concentrates on what actually characierized the labor scarcity 
throughout the periods when enganche was used. 
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Enganche developed at a time when the initial penetration of 
capitalism in the indigenous communities occurred through the 
expansion of commercial capital. This commercial capital acce- 
Ierated a processof social differentiation which did not immediately 
form a labor market. The formation of the rural proletariate un- 
derwent a slow and uneven development. Peasants of indigenous 
communities maintained access to their means of production, in 
spite of land fragmentation. So, capitalist sectors that required 
any sigiiificant amount of labor had to resort to enganche. This 
system served as a coercive recruiting instrument, and as a way 
to retain labor power, as far as production relations are concerned. 
In order for enganche to comply with the mentioned objectives, 
it required national and regional political and ideological structures 
which were tightly linked to the indigenous societies. This means 
that enganche, as an institution of labor control for capitalist 
enterprises, was organized on the basis of articulation of the 
national society with the indigenous community. In short, although 
enganche was a result of capitalist expansion, it was also the 
conseqL1ence of specific characteristics of the indigenous society. 
The histc)rical complexity of this articulation is ignored by the neo- 
classica/ theoretical perspective. 
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